New Protest Powers in the Crime and Policing Act 2026
On April 29th The Crime and Policing Act 2026 received royal assent. It contains a number of new protest related offences and police powers, some of which are the most significant to have been introduced since the Public Order Act 1986. Now the Act has passed, it is worth seeing what actually made it through Parliament. Before delving into the provisions themselves, it is worth noting that relatively few of them are due to come into force without regulations being passed in the future by the Home Secretary.[1]
Overview
Part 10 of the Act details the provisions, with the most publicised sections being those which relate to the offences of concealing identities at protests, use of pyrotechnics, climbing on war memorials, protests outside a public office-holders home, protests outside places of worship, and the duty imposed on officers to consider the cumulative disruption of protests when deciding whether to impose conditions.[2] However, out of the above, only the offence related to protesting outside a place of worship is due to come into force – on the 29th June.[3] The Home Secretary will be required to pass regulations to bring the others into force, at a time of their choosing. It is worth therefore keeping an eye on what regulations are passed and when, in relation to which provisions. The passing of such regulations is not usually widely publicised, which is an issue in of itself. How many members of the public would know that after the Act had passed, none of the protest related provisions are in force? There are too many provisions to pick apart here; however, I intend to highlight some of the more problematic aspects of the new provisions. Those related to concealing an identity, which officer can impose conditions, and climbing on memorials.
Concealing Identities
Firstly, s 157 introduces an offence of concealing an identity at a protest. It becomes an offence to wear anything that may conceal an identify if within an area which has been designated by an officer under s 158. An officer can create such a designated area where they reasonably believe a protest is likely to take place in the locality, and the protest is likely to involve – or has involved – the commission offences, and it is expedient to prevent or limit these offences that the designation is made.[4] There is a duty for the officer to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that the designation has been made,[5] but of course this does not mean that all members of the public would necessarily be aware of it.
The main problem with the offence of concealing an identity is that intention is irrelevant. It is a strict liability offence. If the person is wearing an item that conceals their identity in a designated area, the offence is made out. Whilst it is a defence for the person to be using an item for health, religious, or work-related reasons,[6] it is not necessary that the person is using the item to deliberately conceal themselves. Wearing a scarf – for fashion reasons – that obscures ones face could be an offence. Neither is it required that the offender knew of the designation at all. A person who did not know about the designation would still commit the offence regardless. Lastly, this offence can be committed by anyone in the locality – not just the protesters. It might seem a needless point to make – why would officers target passers-by? But what if it wasn’t clear who was and wasn’t part of the protest? A passer-by wearing an item that conceals their identity commits the offence as much as a protester does. Needless to say, the lack of safeguards in relation to how this power may be wielded is problematic, seemingly dependent upon the fact that officers will be reasonable in their use of it.
Who Can Impose Conditions?
The new power obliging officers to consider the cumulative disruption caused by processions and assemblies has also made it into the Act,[7] though it remains as it was when I covered this issue in a previous post. I won’t therefore go over this again. What I had failed to notice before, was that the Act would make quite a significant change to the discretionary structure of public order policing re the use of conditions. Under the original 1986 Act, where a protest has not been notified beforehand, only the senior officer present at the scene of a protest could impose conditions.[8] However, public order policing is a highly centralised operation, with strict hierarchies of responsibility.
The Gold and Silver commanders who are responsible for devising the overall strategies and tactics to be used are rarely on the ground of a protest,[9] though they would have the most human rights training given their seniority. The decisions to impose conditions on spontaneous or unnotified protests would likely have therefore fallen to officers of lower rank, who may have been told by commanders that the strategy is to impose conditions when the situation warrants it. These officers would likely not have had the human rights training that the commanders had received, and could undermine the purpose of having trained commanders if they were to use conditions in a problematic manner.
The new provision will, for the first time, allow commanders who are not present at the scene of spontaneous or unnotified protests to impose conditions. On the one hand, this can be considered a good thing – it means that officers making those decisions have received higher levels of human rights training, and ensures that accountability rests with them. However, not being on the ground to assess the actual situation for themselves poses problems regarding whether they would be able to accurately assess the circumstances.
I submitted an FOI regarding the JSO slow marches of summer 2023 to interrogate this issue for my own research. I requested the rank and name of officers who had authorised the use of conditions in relation to the slow marches, as those details appeared on the appropriate authorisation forms. Of the 24 events I requested information in relation to, they had information on only 4 – two of which had names redacted for privacy reasons due to their ranks being below that of Chief Superintendent. The two whose rank was provided were deputy assistant commissioners. One must assume that they had been present at the scenes of these slow marches, though being above the rank of commanders it would seem slightly odd if they were. Regardless, there is a seemingly significant lack of data regarding the use of conditions – who is authorising them and what is their rank? Shifting the decisions to commanders may therefore provide greater clarity and accountability, notwithstanding that they may not be able to assess the situation on the ground with their own eyes.
Climbing on Memorials
The last issue I wish to address is the offence of climbing on a specified memorial. It would be an offence to do so unless the person ‘had a good reason for doing so’, owned it themselves, or had the owner’s consent.[10] What is problematic here – aside from the nature of the offence itself – is that a ‘good reason’ is not defined or specified. A ‘good reason’ is incredibly nebulous as a concept. It is not said anywhere that protest is not a good reason, and yet, we must assume that it is not given that Parliament passed this offence to target such activity at protests. Would climbing a memorial be an offence at a state sanctioned event, such as a royal procession? If not, why not? Why would that be a good reason but protest not be? We could assume it is because of the intention of the person climbing rather than the act itself. One is considered to be disrespectful, and the other not. The maximum sentence for showing such disrespect to a memorial would be 3 months in prison. Which seems quite high for what is essentially an act that merely offends rather than actually harms anyone.
[1] Crime and Policing Act 2026 (CPA), s 255.
[2] CPA, ss 157, 160, 161, 162, and 165.
[3] CPA, s 255.
[4] CPA), s 158(1).
[5] CPA, s 158(2).
[6] CPA, s 157(2).
[7] CPA, s 165.
[8] Public Order Act 1986, ss 12(2)(a) and 14(2)(a).
[9] College of Policing, ‘Command Structure and Role Profiles’ (College of Policing, 2026) <https://www.college.police.uk/app/public-order-public-safety/command-structure-role-profiles> [Accessed on 15 May 2026].
[10] CPA, s 161(2).
