Cumulative Disruption Returns: The Crime and Policing Bill
The Crime and Policing Bill is currently making its way through the House of Lords,[1] seeking to re-introduce the concept of cumulative disruption into protest regulation previously attempted by Suellva Braverman.[2] Back in 2023, during a period of time where Just Stop Oil conducted over 500 slow marches over a period of three months in London,[3] then Home Secretary Suella Braverman sought to amend the Public Order Act 1986 via secondary legislation.[4] The regulations provided police officers with the power to consider cumulative disruption when deciding whether to impose conditions on public assemblies or processions.[5] These regulations were struck down by the High Court, upheld by the Court of Appeal, due to the fact that Braverman had sought to change the meaning of ‘serious’ to ‘more than minor’ rather than clarify it, a power she did not have.[6]
The current form of these provisions will not be capable of being struck down by the courts, being passed as primary legislation. However, they retain ‘serious’ as the threshold rather than reducing it to more than minor, therefore avoiding that particular issue. They also differ in another significant respect. In Braverman’s regulations, a consideration of cumulative disruption when imposing conditions was optional, now it will be mandatory.[7] There are a number of problems with these provisions, the totality of which is that is that they furnish upon the police such a wide set of discretionary measures that we would effectively protest at their discretion and by their permission. In all but the most minor of circumstances the police would be able to justify, according to their interpretation and application of the law, imposing conditions on almost any protest. Firstly, there is no time limit set regarding how far back in time a consideration of cumulative disruption may extend. Secondly, a chief officer may designate an officer (or officers) to be able to impose conditions at a scene, regardless of their seniority or experience. Lastly, the amendments may cause protesters, or rather counter-protesters, to engage in strategic disruption tactics.
A ‘New’ Mandatory Power
On the first issue, an officer must consider all relevant cumulative disruption when deciding whether to impose conditions upon a protest under the bill. It is arguable that a limit is set on how far into the past a consideration of cumulative disruption may extend is provided by the term ‘relevant’.[8] However, it is clarified in the bill as disruption resulting from any public procession or assembly that was held, is being held, or is intended to be held in the same area, regardless of whether they are organised or attended by the same people.[9] Therefore, where ‘relevant’ is stated to mean ‘any’, can or should we take this at face value? Can an officer consider the disruption caused by any protest that has ever occurred in an area? Surely this would result in every protest automatically risking serious disruption, as cumulatively, all historic protest will have resulted over time in cumulatively risking sufficient disruption.
A limitation on this may be that it must relate to ‘the life of the community’’. The community must also, by necessity, be within the area deemed relevant by the officer upon a consideration of the extent of disruption caused.[10] Community is no longer defined explicitly – this was previously defined as anyone affected by a protest in Braverman’s regulations.[11] Therefore, an officer is open to consider that only cumulative disruption that has affected this current community (people who are living or within the area of the disruptive impact) must be considered. Protests that did not affect this current community would therefore not be relevant and may limit how far back in time a ‘relevant’ protest may be.
The scope of this power is not only broad but it is difficult to know how it will be applied in practice. What about those areas at the periphery of where the disruption extends? If we imagine overlapping areas of disruptive impact, would this overlap in areas cause that section to be considered an area in of itself that is at higher risk of future regulation? How will this be determined and assessed, either by Public Order Commanders or by officers on the ground? How many protesters are going to have the resources to challenge police decisions to impose conditions under the use of these powers? Only one has attempted this in recent years, and this was Greta Thunberg.[12] The court held that the conditions had been imposed unlawfully;[13] however, these types of cases are incredibly rare. Most protesters do not have the resources to challenge such decisions, and may simply accept the conditions rather than risk arrest and a criminal conviction. The bargaining power this adds to the police arsenal will be quite significant, particularly for groups who do not ordinarily challenge police authority or breach conditions set upon them.
Designating Officers to Impose Conditions
The second issue is that a (amended from ‘the’) chief of police may designate officers to be able to impose conditions at the scene of a protest.[14] In its current form under the POA 86, ‘the senior officer’ present at the scene is furnished with this task where the protest occurs without prior notification.[15] This does not necessarily mean that an officer of high seniority will make that decision, for if there are none present at the time then the highest level officer could technically be a constable (whether it is would depend very much on the circumstance). Regardless, under the bill, a chief of police may empower more than one officer to impose conditions, regardless of their seniority, training, or experience. The provision simply states that an officer authorised by a chief officer may impose conditions.[16] What then is to stop a chief officer from using this power to permit all officers to do so? What result would this have on the quality of decision making on the ground? By placing this decision in ‘the senior officer’ it surely must have been hoped that these decisions were being made by officers with more experience and training than street level constables. How long do these authorisations last? Are they perpetual? Or based solely on that protest event?
Whilst the Government may claim that these provisions will clarify the law, the police will be placed into the unenviable position of being required to conduct challenging assessments on the ground at protest events, relying upon powers that are broadly drafted. This is unlikely to result in clarity. Particularly if protesters disagree with the police assessment and interpretation of the law. The police are increasingly being given powers so that the Government may wash their hands of the issue and say – well it is on them. We gave them the powers to deal with it. In this circumstance the police can easily become the fall guys. Where they may have the power to impose conditions on almost any protest that occurs, the question for the police will be not whether they can, but whether they should. This will likely vary according to a number of factors, particularly the perceived legitimacy of the protesters in the eyes of the police.[17] There is a risk, in this sense, that the police may become increasingly politicised, pressured into using their powers against groups that do not have public or political support and withholding them from those who do.
Strategic Disruption Tactics
The final issue is that these provisions may result in protest groups engaging in tactical disruption. It may be possible, for example, for counter protest groups to go to a location in advance of the protest they wish to challenge, disrupt that area, and then cause a cumulative impact such that the protest that is scheduled to occur afterward would be essentially blocked from occurring. Strategic disruption may become more widespread, with protesters seeking to disrupt the chances that other protest groups will be able to have their voices heard. The only thing that matters is that there is a risk of serious disruption being caused, not that it actually occurs, and it would not need to be caused by the same protest group or people. Time would tell in this regard; however, it would become a risk for all protest groups.
[1] Crime and Policing Bill (CP Bill) (As amended in HoL Committee), available at: <https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/64840/documents/7819> [Accessed on 09 February 2026].
[2] The Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023), SI 2023/655.
[3] Jess Warren and PA Media, ‘Just stop Oil Protests Costs Met Police £7.7m since April’ BBC, 25 July 2023, Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-66301164> [Accessed on 17 August 2024].
[4] SI 2023 (n 2).
[5] SI 2023 (n 2), ss 2(2)(b) and 3(2)(b).
[6] R (on the Application of National Council for Civil Liberties) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Liberty) [2025] EWCA Civ 571, [63].
[7] CP Bill (n 1), ss 140(2) and (3).
[8] ibid.
[9] ibid.
[10] ibid, s 140(2)(2BC) and (3)(2BC).
[11] SI 2023 (n 2), ss 2(2)(c) and 3(2)(c).
[12] Damien Gayle, ‘Judge throws out case against Greta Thunberg and other London Protesters’ The Guardian (London, 2 February 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/feb/02/judge-throws-out-case-against-greta-thunberg-and-other-london-protesters> [Accessed on 10 February 2024].
[13] Gayle (n 12).
[14] CP Bill (n 1), ss 141(2)(b)(ii) and (3)(b)(ii).
[15] Public Order Act 1986, ss 12(1) and 14(1).
[16] CP Bill (n 1), ss 141(2)(b)(ii) and (3)(b)(ii).
[17] William Jackson et al, ‘Policing Unacceptable Protest in England and Wales: A Case Study of the Policing of Anti-Fracking Protests’ (2019) 39(1) Critical Social Policy 23, 38-39.
